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Conflict and social vulnerability to climate change:
Lessons from Gaza
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In societies marred by conflict, the propensity of populations to be harmed by climate hazards is likely to be increased by their
exposure to violence and other coercive practices. Stakeholder assessments of climate vulnerability, as reported here for the
Gaza Strip, can capture the qualitative experience of harm caused by conflict-related practices as these relate to, and interact
with, forecasted climatic risks. The key pathways of climate vulnerability identified by stakeholders in Gaza relate above all to
expected impacts on food security and water security. Exploration of these vulnerability pathways reveals conflict-structured
non-climatic risks overwhelming forecasted climate risks. The prevalence in Gaza of short-term ‘enforced coping’ prevents
the development of long-term adaptive capacity. Climate vulnerability assessments in (post)conflict environments should
acknowledge the methodological and political-policy challenges caused by chronic, non-climatic sources of harm.
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1. Introduction
What the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) labels as ‘key’ vulnerabilities to
climate change – those meriting policy attention
as symptomatic of ‘dangerous anthropogenic
interference’ with the climate system (UNFCCC
Article 2) – are seen to depend on the magnitude,
timing and distribution of climate impacts. Delib-
erations on climate impacts are viewed as inher-
ently political: they feature value judgements
about the acceptability of potential risks, and
potential adaptation and mitigation measures
(Schneider et al., 2007, p.784). These are particu-
larly testing considerations in societies affected
by conflict, as the risks posed by future climate
impacts may be overwhelmed by present threats
to lives and livelihoods arising from the threat
or use of violence. In such circumstances, partici-
patory vulnerability assessments can, with
appropriate expert assistance, provide essential
information on climate risks as experienced
within conditions of conflict. This article exam-
ines stakeholder representations of climate vul-
nerability in the context of a territory, the Gaza
Strip, subject to Israeli ‘occupation’, including
the imposition, since January 2006, of an econ-
omic blockade and closure regime.1
At least in terms of exposure to climate change,
Palestinians in Gaza face disruptive climate
impacts on par with the populations of other
semi-arid territories in the eastern Mediterra-
nean. There is some evidence that average temp-
eratures in the region have increased steadily
over the past four decades (e.g. El-Kadi, 2005;
Krichak et al., 2007; Kafle and Bruins, 2009). Fur-
thermore, climate simulations recently under-
taken with regional models have delivered
generally consistent results (Kitoh et al., 2008;
Somot et al., 2008; Khatib, 2009). Over the
research article
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course of this century, and depending on the
global emissions scenario employed: (i) a decrease
in precipitation of up to 35 per cent (with signifi-
cant seasonal variation), (ii) a significant
warming of between 2.6 and 4.88C, (iii) a ten-
dency towards more extreme weather events
and (iv) a rise in sea level have been predicted.
For the Gazan population of the occupied Palesti-
nian territory (oPt),2 the biophysical impacts
expected from these trends include an increased
probability of flash floods, droughts, desertifica-
tion and saline intrusion into groundwater
(UNDP, 2010a, pp.9–13).
This article examines the stakeholder consul-
tation component of a United Nations Develop-
ment Programme (UNDP)-funded vulnerability
assessment examining climate risk conditions in
the Gaza Strip. The aim of the stakeholder consul-
tation – undertaken between December 2008 and
August 2009 – was to identify ‘biophysical’ deter-
minants of climate vulnerability as experienced
or judged by representatives of relevant govern-
ing authorities and civil society organizations.
Framed by a UNDP human security perspective,
and informed by a review of regional climate
science predictions, the initial premise for stake-
holder consultations was that the life and liveli-
hood conditions particularly sensitive to
water-related stresses were likely to be key areas
of climate vulnerability. As noted below, this
resulted in a focus on climate risks to public
health and agricultural livelihoods, though
conflict-related impacts were argued, by stake-
holders, to compound forecasted climate
changes. The next section of this article sets out
the concept of climate vulnerability employed
(Section 2). After outlining the stakeholder assess-
ment methodology, the key pathways of climate
vulnerability identified in Gaza are discussed
(Section 3). Conjoined with short-term and long-
term response capabilities (Section 4), these
provide a collective Palestinian representation
of key climate vulnerabilities. It is argued that,
while the UNDP assessment process generated
significant information on the climate risks per-
ceived by stakeholder representatives, its preoc-
cupation with climate impacts prevented a more
in-depth scrutiny of the conflict-laden determi-
nants of water and food insecurity.
2. Framing climate vulnerability in conﬂict
zones
According to the IPCC, vulnerability to climate
change is ‘the propensity of human and ecologi-
cal systems to suffer harm and their ability to
respond to stresses imposed as a result of climate
change effects’ (Adger et al., 2007, p.720). While
early IPCC formulations of vulnerability high-
lighted the biophysical impacts of climate
change, it is now recognized that climate vulner-
ability includes both the ‘external’ exposure of
socio-ecological systems and their ‘internal’
susceptibility and adaptive capacity (Kelly and
Adger, 2000; Brooks, 2003; Adger, 2006; Fu¨ssel
and Klein, 2006). This integrated understanding
of vulnerability is evident in the Fourth Assessment
Report and the IPCC-sponsored global research
project, Assessment of Impacts and Adaptations to
Climate Change (Leary et al., 2008). In principle,
it opens up vulnerability assessments to consider
the full range of non-climatic determinants,
including socio-political and socio-economic
evaluations of climate impacts, although the
IPCC has still been charged with neglecting the
root causes of vulnerability (Gaillard, 2010,
p.224). Such criticism is misplaced insofar it
ignores the role of IPCC Working Group II in iden-
tifying the high climate vulnerability of poor and
marginalized communities (especially in develop-
ing countries), as well as its explicit call for more
research on the causal links between development
paths and vulnerabilities to climate change
(Schneider et al., 2007, p.804). Nevertheless, the
regional and sectoral scope of IPCC assessments
can displace scientific and policy attention from
key climate vulnerabilities facing poorer popu-
lations in sub-regions or territories exposed to
the effects of conflict. The Gaza Strip is one such
conflict zone where a finer-grained treatment is
justified, and discussion – as here – on the inter-
face of conflict and climate at the community
level is neglected in the literature.
2 Mason et al.
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In its contribution to the Fourth Assessment
Report, IPCC Working Group II acknowledges
that fragile governance systems and conflicts,
armed and otherwise, typically heighten the vul-
nerability of people to climate risks, though only
recent conflicts in Africa – within the Greater
Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes region – are
discussed (Boko et al., 2007, pp.442–443). More
widely, Barnett (2006, pp.117–125) identifies at
least 37 countries facing or recovering from con-
flict since 1989, arguing that their affected popu-
lations are especially vulnerable to climate
variability and extremes because of their low
capacity to cope with, and recover from, such
stresses. Most of these countries, he notes, have
faced significant food shortfalls as natural
resource assets and livelihood opportunities
have been severely eroded by the effects of con-
flict (see also Barnett and Adger, 2010). In
societies marred by protracted military occu-
pation, as in East Timor (1975–1999) and the
oPt (1967–), the entrenched social vulnerability
created by systemic human rights violations is
likely to overwhelm the impacts of particular
climate hazards (Barnett, 2010, pp.260–262;
Mason, 2011). For Gaza, as argued below, the
Israeli closure regime significantly affects the
capacity of Palestinians to cope with, and adapt
to, key climate risks. The term ‘enforced coping’
is used to refer to the constrained (and possibly
harmful) ways in which people seek to mitigate
or avoid significant climate-related harm under
conditions of exceptional vulnerability. The pres-
ence of enforced coping questions the view (e.g.
Agrawal and Perrin, 2009, p.354) that govern-
ments and other external actors necessarily
increase the adaptive capacity of economically
marginal communities by strengthening the
existing coping strategies of households and
other social groups (cf. Smit and Wandel, 2006,
p.289).
The focus here is on a UNDP-funded stake-
holder assessment of climate vulnerability in
Gaza, which took place between December 2008
and August 2009 and was part of a climate
change adaptation initiative in support of
broader ‘good governance’ capacity-building for
the Palestinian Authority aligned with inter-
national donor interests (UNDP, 2010a). Given
pressing humanitarian and development needs
in Gaza and the West Bank, the UNDP climate
adaptation work for the Palestinians was framed
explicitly by the agency’s perspective on
‘human security’, defined as ‘the liberation of
human beings from those intense, extensive, pro-
longed, and comprehensive threats to which
their lives and freedom are vulnerable’ (UNDP,
2009, p.2; see Dalby, 2009, pp.41–43).
UNDP-sponsored human security reports cover-
ing the Middle East have paid growing attention
to major environmental threats, notably those
impacting on water availability and food pro-
duction (UNDP, 2009, pp.47–50; 2010b, pp.89–
93). Framing human security in a climate vulner-
ability context highlights human capacities and
freedoms to pursue lives and livelihoods free
from threats induced or compounded by climate
hazards (O’Brien et al., 2007; Adger, 2010;
Pelling, 2010). Yet, at least in conflict situations,
a preoccupation with climate hazards or risks
can in practice displace methodological and
policy attention away from chronic non-climatic
determinants of social vulnerability. As noted
below (Section 3), stakeholder consultations in
Gaza identified water insecurity and food insecur-
ity as key threats to human security, but more
from ongoing military and security practices
than forecasted climate risks.
3. Climate vulnerability pathways in the
Gaza Strip
With the Palestinian Environmental Quality
Authority (EQA) as the leading agency, the stake-
holder assessment of climate risk conditions in
the Gaza Strip was part of a wider climate adap-
tation planning exercise for the oPt funded by
UNDP. This initiative was directly informed
by the UNDP Adaptation Policy Frameworks for
Climate Change, which identifies stakeholders as
those affected by, or with an interest in, climate
change decision-making (Conde and Lonsdale,
2005, p.51). It also reflected developing
Conflict and social vulnerability to climate change 3
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scholarship on participatory vulnerability assess-
ments as vehicles for identifying risk conditions
and anticipated community responses as experi-
enced or judged by affected parties (Delica-
Willison and Willison, 2004; Smit and Wandel,
2006; Vogel et al., 2007). The full stakeholder
engagement in both Gaza and the West Bank
included interviews with decision makers and
NGO representatives, a questionnaire survey of
relevant experts (eliciting perceptions on
climate change impacts), stakeholder consul-
tation workshops and feedback meetings on a
draft Climate Change Adaptation Strategy (see
UNDP, 2010a, pp.22–36). Both the stakeholder
vulnerability assessments in Gaza and the West
Bank featured a scoping meeting followed by
two deliberative group sessions designed to
reach agreement on key vulnerability pathways.
In Gaza, the relevant stakeholders included
EQA, the Palestinian Water Authority (PWA) and
Coastal Municipalities Water Utility (CMWU)
officials (attending as independent water
experts), UNDP Gaza Strip staff, environmental
scientists from local universities and NGO repre-
sentatives. UN-imposed rules prevented any
meetings with officials from the Hamas govern-
ment, which meant that representatives from
several Islamist NGOs refused to become
involved: this unsettled the ostensible political
neutrality and impartiality of the climate assess-
ment. The fragile security situation in Gaza at
the time of the vulnerability consultations also
placed major constraints on the timing and
scope of the stakeholder engagement: the initial
scoping meeting, held in December 2008 just
prior to an Israeli military assault on the Strip
(Operation Cast Lead), took place by video-
conference between the UNDP offices in Gaza
City and Ramallah. At this meeting, which
included a review of regional climate scenarios
in the scientific literature, it was agreed that the
vulnerability assessment in the Gaza Strip
should focus on human insecurity as it relates to
water resources insecurity – defined as physically
unsustainable withdrawal rates coupled with the
lack of access of individuals to sufficient safe
water for heath and well-being – and food
insecurity – defined as the lack of access of individ-
uals to sufficient safe food for health and well-
being. Access restrictions on the researchers
meant the stakeholder vulnerability assessments
did not take place until May 2009 and August
2009 – both in Gaza City. These involved
researcher-facilitated iterative discussions with
12 stakeholder representatives to map out
chains of impacts on food and water resources
arising from projected climate risks. This type of
cognitive mapping involves qualitative delibera-
tions on drivers of vulnerability, which can use-
fully inform the prioritization of adaptation
measures if supplemented by a more formal
multi-criteria decision analysis (Downing and
Patwardhan, 2005, pp.74–75; Magnan et al.,
2009, pp.13–14).3
Figure 1 summarizes graphically those key
environmental risks relating to climate vulner-
ability identified collectively and consensually
by stakeholder representatives in the Gaza City
meetings. This highlights the multiple paths
that were judged most likely to impact signifi-
cantly on water security (primarily through
degraded groundwater quality) and food security
(primarily through reduced food production,
which is related back to groundwater quality).
The existing social vulnerability of the residents
of the Gaza Strip to climate hazards is com-
pounded by the expected longer-term risks of
climate change set out on the right-hand side of
the figure. An expected higher variability in pre-
cipitation translates into reduced yields for
rainfed agriculture and a greater frequency of
flash floods. Projected increased temperatures as
a result of climate change were judged by stake-
holders to trigger greater groundwater pumping
because of increased evapotranspiration and
desertification (particularly in the south of the
Strip). In the case of sea temperatures, impacts
on fish stocks were felt to be mixed, with forecasts
that regional warming may stimulate growth of
some fisheries (e.g. sardines), while at the same
time threatening local population extinctions.
The risk of sea-level rise, as well as eroding the
coastline, was forecast to contaminate the
coastal soil and increase the saline intrusion
4 Mason et al.
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already experienced throughout Gaza.4 Interest-
ingly, the risk of reduced amounts of precipi-
tation from climate change was judged to put a
greater strain on future water resources mainly
by increasing the conditions for saline intrusion
into the groundwater aquifer. This reflects a per-
ception that insecurity of water resources is threa-
tened more by contamination than simply by a
volumetric deficit.
However, the bulk of the vulnerability path-
ways mapped out by stakeholders arise from, or
are compounded by, Israeli sanctions on, and
blockade of, the Gaza Strip. The negative effects
on water security and food security resulting
from current conflict-related practices can be
seen on the left-hand side of Figure 1. These key
security impacts, which had a strong experiential
component when relayed by stakeholders, will
now be briefly elaborated on in relation to the
existing understanding of water and food
insecurity in the Gaza Strip: are these represen-
tations of conflict risks as key drivers of climate
FIGURE 1 Climate vulnerability pathways in the Gaza Strip (adapted from UNDP 2010a, p.36)
Conflict and social vulnerability to climate change 5
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vulnerability corroborated by authoritative
sources of environmental knowledge on the
territory?
3.1. Vulnerability pathways to water
resources insecurity
It is acknowledged by independent observers that
Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip suffer the
effects of water insecurity through both water
quantity and water quality issues (Weinthal
et al., 2005; GVC/PHG, 2009; UNEP, 2009;
World Bank, 2009; Shomar, 2010). Gaza lies
above part of the Coastal Aquifer Basin, which
runs from Haifa in Israel to northern Egypt. Pri-
marily due to its permeable sandy cover, the
aquifer itself has ‘intrinsic vulnerability’ to pol-
lution (Almasri, 2008). Israeli over-pumping of
the Israeli portion of the Coastal Aquifer in the
1960s and 1970s led to high rapid salinization
through seawater intrusion. The risk of serious
damage to the aquifer was countered by reducing
abstractions, and the flows were replaced through
increased abstractions from other water sources
(Zeitoun et al., 2009). Palestinians living in the
Gaza Strip are prevented from accessing similar
alternative water sources, which was registered
by in the stakeholder vulnerability assessment
as ‘prevention of external bulk water transfers’.
As a result, and in line with population growth
(represented as a ‘siege/closure’ driver by stake-
holders on account of barriers to population
movement), the Gaza portion of the Coastal
Aquifer Basin has been pumped beyond sustain-
able limits for decades. The ‘sustainable limit’5
of the Coastal Aquifer has been estimated from
299 (HSI, 1999, p.IV) to 420 million cubic
metres/year (MCM/y) (World Bank, 2009, p.27),
of which the Gazan portion is roughly 55MCM/
y (Yacoubi, 2008). Total pumping within the
Gaza Strip in 2008 was estimated at 170 MCM/y
(UNICEF, 2010, p.12). Return flows of very poor
quality from system leaks, wastewater and irriga-
tion are estimated to be between 31 and 51
MCM/y (Palestinian Water Authority, 2010). All
flows considered, the Gaza portion of the
aquifer is being over-drawn at a rate up to three
times its sustainable limit.
The abstraction rate and lack of alternative
water sources lead directly to deteriorating water
quality. It has been estimated that only 5–10
per cent of the portion of the aquifer under
Gaza provides acceptable drinking water (Palesti-
nian Water Authority, 2010, p.27), which
vindicates the stakeholder emphasis on ground-
water contamination as the key vector for water
insecurity. As has been the case in Israel, the
over-abstraction induces increased seawater
intrusion and up-coning, leading to salinization
of the freshwater.6 Untreated or partially treated
wastewater (including sewage infiltrating from
the Northern Treatment Plant in Beit Lahiya,
and the rapidly growing raw sewage outflows
around Khan Younis, Rafah and Wadi Gaza)
seeps into the groundwater, further increasing
nitrate and chloride levels. ‘Reduced wastewater
treatment’ was represented by the Gaza stake-
holders as a ‘siege/closure driver’ of climate vul-
nerability, because Israeli restrictions on the
import of construction materials have immobi-
lized local and donor efforts to treat wastewater:
this risk to water security has been recognized
by international observers, though internal
institutional weaknesses have also been in-
dentified (UNEP, 2009, p.68; World Bank, 2009,
pp.64–66).
As included in the ‘siege/closure’ set of risks by
stakeholders, ‘war damages to water and waste-
water infrastructure’ are perhaps the most direct
conflict-related pathway to water insecurity in
the Gaza Strip. Water quality and sanitation pro-
blems accentuated by the Israeli blockade and
economic sanctions were further stressed during
Operation Cast Lead, which took place during the
period of stakeholder consultations. The Israeli
military operation resulted in serious damage or
destruction to 203 registered agricultural ground-
water wells and four drinking water wells, as well
as damage to over 19,000 metres of water pipes
(Palestinian National Authority, 2009, p.29).
Moreover, a direct hit to the embankment wall
of the Az Zaitoun wastewater treatment plant
led to a wastewater and sludge spillage affecting
6 Mason et al.
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55,000 square metres of agricultural land (UNEP,
2009, pp.33–36). It is clear that, compared to
the current risks to water security posed by recur-
rent military attacks on Gaza, climate change
impacts are negligible.
3.2. Vulnerability pathways to food insecurity
The priority accorded to food security in the sta-
keholder vulnerability assessment mirrors exist-
ing concerns by humanitarian and development
agencies operating in the Gaza Strip.
For households in Gaza, the Food and Agricul-
ture Organization (FAO) defines food insecurity
as households with income and consumption
below US$1.6 per capita per day and households
showing a decrease in total food and non-food
expenditures (Food and Agriculture Organiz-
ation, 2007, p.58). At this scale of household
food security, according to a Joint Rapid Food
Security Assessment conducted in 2008, some
56 per cent of citizens of the Gaza Strip were
‘food insecure’ with 75 per cent receiving food
assistance (WFP/FAO/UNRWA, 2008). A year
later, with the onset of Operation Cast Lead, this
had jumped to 61 per cent (973,600 persons)
food insecure with a further 16 per cent
(218,950 persons) vulnerable to food insecurity
(WFP/FAO, 2009).
As shown in Figure 1, stakeholder perceptions
of climate risks to food insecurity in the Gaza
Strip highlighted food production threats,
whereby various biophysical changes projected
to negatively affect yields are compounded by
the multiple effects of the Israeli closure
regime. Food production is understood in these
vulnerability pathways as a combination of
physical production factors (e.g. water quantity
and quality, agricultural supplements), social
conditions of production (e.g. access to agricul-
tural land, demographic growth) and economic
variables (e.g. markets for exports, prices and
availability of imported food). In these terms,
the ‘trade barriers and market restrictions’ and
‘reduced pesticide/fertilizer imports’ were both
highlighted by stakeholders as contributing to
food insecurity in the Gaza Strip. For example,
the closure of the Strip limits exports, thereby
cutting off a source of income from the
produce (generally strawberries, oranges and
cut flowers) sold in markets in Israel, Egypt or
Europe. Similarly, the stakeholder designation
under current vulnerability risks of (Israeli)
military land confiscation and destruction of
Palestinian orchards is borne out by research
on the impacts of the Israeli security barrier
marking its border with Gaza: this restricted
area (reaching up to 1,500 metres) has reduced
Gaza’s cultivable land by 35 per cent. Since
2000, according to the UN, Israeli access restric-
tions and the associated destruction of agricul-
tural assets in this zone have resulted in the
loss of 735 hectares of olive trees, almost 1,200
hectares of other fruit-bearing trees and 588
hectares of greenhouses: it has been estimated
that the total economic value of all agricultural
losses (including livestock farms) is US$267
million (OCHA-WFP, 2010, pp.19–22).
The closure regime also affects the Gaza Strip
fishing zone, which stakeholders summarized as
‘limited offshore fishing’. This zone has shrunk
from 20 nautical miles (negotiated with Israel
under the 1994 Gaza-Jericho Agreement) to
more restricted limits unilaterally imposed by
Israel – 6 nautical miles from October 2006 and
3 nautical miles since December 2008 ultimately
reducing Palestinian access to maritime areas by
85 per cent (OCHA-WFP, 2010, pp.10–11).
Israeli restrictions of the Gazan fishing zone
have significantly reduced the local fish catch
from 15,000 tonnes a month 10 years ago to
15–20 tonnnes a month in 2010 (OCHA-WFP,
2010, pp.24–25; UNDP, 2010c, p.69).
As shown in Figure 1, the current risks to food
security perceived by stakeholders to derive
from the closure regime constitute conditions
for heightened social vulnerability to biophysical
impacts arising from forecasted climate change –
notably from reduced and more variable precipi-
tation, temperature increases and saline intrusion
from sea-level rise. These impact chains can gen-
erate positive feedback cycles; for example,
reductions in precipitation can exacerbate
Conflict and social vulnerability to climate change 7
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groundwater salinity levels through reduced soil
flushing and groundwater recharge, whereas
reductions in air moisture can increase the soil
water requirement of crops and reduce fruit
production.7 Increased salinity levels in ground-
water would reduce the yields of salt-tolerant
crops (e.g. onions and pulses) and could even
mean that some high-value export crops with
little tolerance to high salinity levels (e.g.
oranges, strawberries, cherry tomatoes and cut
flowers) can no longer be grown across most of
the Gaza Strip. Thus, overall the food production
conditions for domestic consumption and
export-led income generation are simultaneously
eroded.
4. Response capabilities: enforced coping
and adaptation planning
The vulnerability of individuals and groups to
climate-related hazards can be reduced by enhan-
cing both short-term (coping) and long-term
(adaptation) response capabilities. In the Gaza
Strip the current means of avoiding or moderat-
ing such hazards are above all short term and reac-
tive, with little, if any, opportunity at present to
develop longer-term resilience.
4.1. Household and community coping
The high level of climate vulnerability reported
by stakeholders in Gaza is perpetuated by insuffi-
cient resources and livelihood opportunities,
as well as weak institutional capacities. Coping
strategies in the face of water and food insecurity
reveal social resilience, for example, individual
well-digging, rainwater harvesting, purchasing
food on credit and decreasing the amount of
food consumed. In the midst of a hostile political
and economic context, where conventional
low-cost coping strategies (e.g. use of life
savings) have generally been exhausted (WFP/
FAO, 2009), enforced coping is prevalent, with
often harmful long-term effects. In the stake-
holder consultations, for example, negative
public health impacts were reported as a result
of farmers using raw sewage for irrigation (due
to reduced wastewater treatment). It is not sur-
prising to find that community coping practices
responding to water and food insecurity are
related with ways to bypass the Israeli closure
regime, notably increased ‘smuggling’ through
the hundreds of tunnels dug under the border
with Egypt. The capacity of Palestinians in Gaza
to survive under the Israeli blockade is almost
entirely defined by such enforced coping mech-
anisms, which have over time become institutio-
nalized. Thus, the smuggling tunnels are now
reported to be regulated and taxed by the
Hamas government.
The poor quality of drinking water in Gaza,
anticipated by stakeholders to decline even
further with climate change, has already necessi-
tated enforced coping. This is evident from the
increased purchase of desalinated water from
private-sector neighbourhood-level reverse
osmosis units, or the purchase of under-the-sink
water filtration units, both of which contribute
to the ever-greater share of household income
spent on basic services (Palestinian Water Auth-
ority, 2008a; 2008b). However, much of the
water stored in household water tanks remains
biologically contaminated for lack of proper
maintenance (GVC/PHG, 2009, p.15). Neigh-
bourhood water vendors have developed to sell
treated water (again, through small-scale reverse
osmosis plants) to people at a more affordable
cost. As noted by PWA and CMWU representa-
tives in the stakeholder consultations, the
quality of this water is not regulated. Contami-
nation is likely either at the source (because of
poor maintenance) or during transportation
(contaminants entering the jerry-cans and
buckets used to transport the water). The PWA,
CMWU and local municipalities have adapted
their water-supply systems to the situation. In
Khan Younis, for example, the CMWU notifies
the residents about occasional contamination
from wastewater intrusion and when less pol-
luted water may still safely be used for washing.
The water authorities have also developed the
habit of mixing sources of safe and unsafe water
8 Mason et al.
CLIMATE AND DEVELOPMENT
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [L
SE
 L
ibr
ary
], 
[M
ich
ae
l M
as
on
] a
t 0
4:0
4 0
4 O
cto
be
r 2
01
1 
to increase the amount of water available for
drinking, at a marginally safer quality level.
While not extensive, longer-term spon-
taneous adaptation to the combined water and
food insecurity is becoming evident through
the selection by farmers of less water-intensive
and more salt-resistant crops, such as dates.
Such agricultural practice is in fact a return to
the traditional crops of the Gaza Strip, whereas
cultivation of water-intensive citrus production
originated with Israeli settlers who used to
reside in Gaza. The non-availability of fertilizers
is encouraging farmers to rediscover organic
methods, while they have also piloted the use
of solar food-drying techniques as a result of
the limited availability of cooking gas. Yet if, in
a worst-case climate change scenario, an increase
in crop water requirements combines with a
further decrease in water quality, such coping
mechanisms may prove insufficient to sustain
farming livelihoods.
4.2. Climate change adaptation planning
for Gaza
Without the capacity to move beyond enforced
coping, which is often destructive of social capital
(e.g. local disputes over water), communities in
Gaza face present and future climate hazards with
little institutional protection. Adaptation to
climate change can involve governmental, civil
society and private sector actors. Logically, the
initial focus of any such adaptation in Gaza
would lie with state institutions, as they are respon-
sible for setting the general plans and policies by
which significant climate change impacts can be
addressed by all societal actors. However, due to
Israeli occupational practices and the political
split between the Hamas-led government in Gaza
and the Ramallah-based Palestinian Authority,
there is currently little political capacity for mana-
ging climate risk in the Gaza Strip.
In the UNDP-funded climate adaptation con-
sultations, it was noted by stakeholders in Gaza
that an existing Environmental Preparedness Plan
for the Gaza Strip could serve as a vehicle for
adaptation planning. It was claimed that this
plan could be developed (and integrate water
resources management, coastal management,
agricultural planning, land use, etc.) to take
into account real and potential climate change
impacts (Palestinian Water Authority, 2008b,
p.14; UNDP, 2010a, pp.30–31). Similarly, there
is a Coastal Area Protection and Management
Plan, which has been awaiting implementation
since 2000 (Ministry of Environmental Affairs,
2000). This plan addresses observed and
expected damages to seawater quality (e.g.
from solid waste dumping and wastewater
runoff) and the coast (e.g. dune erosion from
sand mining) as a result of human activities. It
also considers the impacts of sea-level rise
attributed to climate change and makes specific
recommendations to help conserve coastal
areas – such as ‘set back lines’ (beyond which
no construction is allowed), improvements in
fisheries legislation and habitat conservation
efforts. The weak regulatory and legal context
in the Gaza Strip means that that these rec-
ommendations have not been implemented,
while the political situation has seen policy-
making in the Strip detached from relevant
disaster risk reduction and climate planning
initiatives in the West Bank.8
In response to the severe water insecurity in
Gaza, governmental actors are considering new
bulk-water solutions, whether from transpor-
tation, importation or desalination (Palestinian
Water Authority, 2008a). Large-scale (but step-by-
step) desalination is a possible long-term solution
to the freshwater crisis in the Strip. Increased pur-
chase of water from Israel is currently seen as pro-
blematic by Palestinian authorities for reasons of
cost, quality and national security. Imported
water from Egypt is another option for mitigating
increasing water scarcity in the context of climate
change, although this is problematic as well due to
Egypt’s strained relations with other riparian
states sharing the Nile Basin. The prospect for
such large-scale interventions is currently
remote, as the major international donors
needed to finance them have a policy of
non-engagement with the Hamas government.
Conflict and social vulnerability to climate change 9
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5. Conclusion
This article has situated the potential impacts on
climate risk to communities in Gaza in terms of
their existing exposure to violence and other
coercive practices. Building on a UNDP-sup-
ported participatory vulnerability assessment
(2008–2009) designed to identify climate risk
conditions in Gaza, the study has employed a
human security framing to identify life and
livelihood threats induced by perceived climate
harm, particularly at the community level. The
terms of reference for the UNDP assessment
were initially restricted to the ‘technical’
mapping of biophysical risks, and were unsurpris-
ingly challenged by stakeholders in Gaza who
stressed the overwhelming influence of Israeli
military and security practices on their lives. Sta-
keholder feedback identified occupation-related
conditions as constitutive of the social vulner-
ability of Palestinians to climate variability and
change; for example, a third of arable land in
Gaza Strip is off-limits to farmers because it falls
within the Israeli Defense Force-declared
no-access zone adjoining the border, while
Israeli restrictions also prevent bulk imports of
clean water into Gaza.
The Israeli blockade of Gaza significantly
affects the manner in which Palestinians cope
with, and adapt to, key climate risks.9 The
UNDP stakeholder consultations identified ‘vul-
nerability pathways’ leading to severe food and
water insecurity (seen primarily in terms of food
production and water quality). These responses
unsettled a donor-driven ‘human security’
methodology designed to identify climate vul-
nerability in Gaza according to future climate
risks – part of a ‘good governance’ agenda por-
trayed as politically neutral, which prevented a
more in-depth scrutiny of sources of vulner-
ability. Exploration of these vulnerability path-
ways reveals conflict-structured non-climatic
risks overwhelming forecasted climate risks. The
prevalence in Gaza of short-term ‘enforced
coping’ prevents the development of long-term
adaptive capacity, though enforced coping
strategies may be resilient for short periods in pro-
tecting lives and livelihoods from significant
harm. Climate vulnerability assessments in
(post)conflict environments should acknowledge
the methodological and political-policy chal-
lenges caused by the extensive presence of
chronic, non-climatic sources of harm.
Notes
1. While Israel has stated that, with its unilateral with-
drawal from the Gaza Strip in September 2005, its
status as an occupying Power there has finished, it
still maintains effective control of the Strip and
thus remains bound by international humanitarian
obligations regarding belligerent occupation (Din-
stein, 2009, pp.276–280).
2. The use, in this article, of the term ‘occupied
Palestinian territory’ follows the accepted nomen-
clature used by the United Nations agencies in the
region.
3. On the use of this stakeholder vulnerability assess-
ment in the identification and prioritization of pro-
posed climate adaptation measures, which is not
discussed here, see UNDP (2010a, pp.41–47).
4. There is much uncertainty over the magnitude of
this rise for the eastern Mediterranean by 2100:
Israeli scientists have forecast an increase of 0.1 m
every decade (Office of the Chief Scientist, 2008),
which falls within recent global estimates of 0.6–
1.6 m (see Jevrejeva et al., 2010).
5. The concept of safe yield and sustainable limits of
aquifers is highly contested (e.g. Bredehoeft, 1997).
Here ‘sustainable limit’ refers to the rough mean
recharge rate, that is, the amount of rainwater
flowing into the Gaza portion of the Coastal Aquifer.
6. It should be noted that an additional source of con-
tamination of the aquifer occurs through natural
processes – the Eocene salts migrating under the
border from Israel (Vengosh et al., 2005).
7. For example, according to CROPWAT simulations
conducted by the PWA, an annual average increase
in temperature of 18C will increase crop water
requirements in the Gaza Strip by 6–11 per cent
(UNDP, 2010a, p.31).
8. The reconciliation pact signed in May 2011 by Fatah
and Hamas representatives offers hope for an
improved domestic political environment – at
10 Mason et al.
CLIMATE AND DEVELOPMENT
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [L
SE
 L
ibr
ary
], 
[M
ich
ae
l M
as
on
] a
t 0
4:0
4 0
4 O
cto
be
r 2
01
1 
least for more integrated Palestinian planning on
climate change adaptation.
9. In June 2010, under diplomatic pressure, Israel
announced an easing of the blockade, though
major restrictions continued on imports of humani-
tarian materials and all exports from Gaza remained
banned (International Federation for Human Rights,
2010).
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